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New Book on Marcos Says U.S. Knew of His '72 Martial-Law Plans

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J WASHINGTON, April 18 — Contrary to official assertions, the United States Embassy in Manila knew that President Ferdinand E. Marcos was about to declare martial law in 1972 and did not act to stop him, according to a new book by Raymond Bonner.

Drawing heavily on previously classified State Department and Central Intelligence Agency documents, Mr. Bonner contends that the C.I.A. got a copy of the martial law declaration several days before Mr. Marcos announced it. The document was provided by a Filipino informer whom the C.I.A. had recruited from among the small group of confidants who helped Mr. Marcos plan martial law.

The book also contends that President Marcos was not concerned about possible adverse American reaction because he had telephoned President Nixon, who said he had no objection to Mr. Marcos assuming absolute power.

The book, "Waltzing With a Dictator: The Marcoses and the Making of

American Policy," will be published next week by Times Books, which is a division of Random House. Mr. Bonner is a former correspondent for The New York Times who has also written a book about El Salvador.

Look at Long U.S. Role

In his new book, Mr. Bonner asserts that American acquiescence to the martial-law declaration was part of a long-term pattern of the American role in Philippine politics. The book says that role was to bolster leaders who were seen as friendly to Washington regardless of how corrupt or oppressive they were.

The close ties between American Presidents and Mr. Marcos were cemented by the lavish hospitality of Mr. Marcos and his wife, Imelda, as when Ronald Reagan, then Governor of California, stayed at Malacanang Palace in 1969, Mr. Bonner writes.

Also helpful, according to a C.I.A. memorandum Mr. Bonner obtained, was the \$250,000 the Marcoses gave President Nixon for his 1972 Presidential campaign. The memorandum was considered so sensitive that instead of

being sent as a cable it was hand-delivered to the agency's headquarters in Langley, Va. During one of the Water-gate trials, Federal prosecutors found evidence of a smaller Marcos-connected contribution, but the new book refers to different evidence. Mr. Bonner said Mr. Nixon declined to be interviewed for the book. Telephone calls to Mr. Nixon's offices on Friday and Saturday went unanswered.

Other Disclosure in Book

These are among the other disclosures in the book:

¶As early as 1953, the Central Intelligence Agency under Edward G. Lansdale provided more than \$1 million to help elect Ramon Magsaysay President, with a C.I.A. agent masquerading as a journalist for The Christian Science Monitor writing Mr. Magsaysay's speeches, the book says. Once, when Mr. Magsaysay delivered a speech written by a Filipino, Mr. Lansdale was so enraged he knocked Mr. Magsaysay out. The C.I.A. went so far as to drug the drinks of Mr. Magsaysay's incumbent opponent, President Elpidio Quirino, and discussed assassinating an out-

spoken opposition senator.

¶To help persuade Mr. Marcos to dispatch a small civic action team to Vietnam, President Johnson agreed to pay him \$39 million secretly, with State Department officers delivering the money in quarterly checks.

¶The C.I.A. early on was aware that Mr. Marcos and his wife were amassing huge personal fortunes. In 1969, four years after Mr. Marcos was first elected president, an agency profile concluded that he had already stolen several hundred million dollars, Mr. Bonner writes. A C.I.A. study of Mrs. Marcos in 1976 determined that she had taken over a portfolio of four dozen companies, including several banks, worth at least \$150 million.

The most striking new material in the book is Mr. Bonner's disclosure that the C.I.A. warned the embassy that Mr. Marcos would declare martial law in 1972. The information was passed on to Ambassador Henry Byroade, who returned to Washington to confer with President Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger, then the national security adviser.

Mr. Nixon "seemed bored" by the news, a former member of the National Security Council staff who was present told Mr. Bonner. Ambassador Byroade later told Mr. Marcos that Washington would back him if martial law was needed to put down the then-tiny Communist insurgency. This was the pretext Mr. Marcos cited in declaring martial law.

"If we just left it to the ordinary budget process, we got cut off at the knees right at the first level," he said. Even on appeal, requests for more money for more officers or other improvements were almost always rejected.

Security Clearances: Cuts of a Million

Instead, the Defense Department made a major effort to reduce the number of people who held security clearances. The number was lowered, from 4.1 million in 1985 to just under 3 million last October, but many officials said they believed that was a "reform" with little meaning.

"It's easy to belittle it, because most of these were people who didn't have access to classified materials anyway," Mr. Snider said.

As a result of the earlier spy cases, studies were started and recommendations were made. "New policies were accepted by the Defense Department," Mr. Snider said. But in most cases "the funding was never provided to carry them out."

As a result of the Moscow embassy spy scandal, President Reagan announced three new studies earlier this month, and he ordered the National Security Council to "make comprehensive recommendations to me on counterintelligence and security policies, procedures and accountability."

Now some intelligence officials are weary; others are frustrated. One senior intelligence official who has been deeply involved in efforts to improve counterespionage policy for the last several years said, "Some of these problems were hard to fix, but there was never any intention of doing it."

He and other officials cite several reasons for the failure to make significant changes, chief among them an unwillingness to spend the money. In most Government agencies, counterespionage is a subsidiary function, and money spent to hire more security officers "is money you're taking out of some other pocket," General Faurer said. "Logic is constantly set aside for money reasons."

Damage From Spying: It's Put in Billions

He and other officials said they believed additional money spent for security could actually save money in the end. Damage assessments from recent spy cases suggest that it will cost billions of dollars to devise and deploy new systems to replace those compromised by Soviet spies.

But "in almost every case," a Senate aide involved with the matter said, "counterintelligence runs counter to the agency's main mission, and so it's difficult to get the attention it deserves."

At the Defense Department, for example, if money is spent to hire more

security officers, less money is available for buying weapons.

And at the State Department, many officers said they believed fortifying embassies and stationing more guards was the antithesis of diplomacy, the purpose of which is to improve relations.

Another problem is proving beyond a doubt that espionage really does cost the nation so much money that the Administration and Congress would be willing to spend money to impede it.

The recent House Intelligence Committee report, for example, said "members of the Walker spy ring betrayed key U.S. Navy submarine technology."

"This technology led to improvements in Soviet submarines sooner than expected," the report said.

General Faurer, who directed the National Security Agency during many of the years the Walker spy ring operated, said that the conclusion might be valid, "but it's all terribly soft."

The Walkers gave away information, he said, and "Soviet submarine technology improved. You build a circumstantial case with extrapolations. But most often you don't have a real smoking gun" or proof that espionage losses did in fact lead to Soviet military gains.

When there is direct evidence, he added, "the information is usually so sensitive that you can't bring it to the table at almost any level."

Considering the recent history of counterespionage, General Faurer said, "I would love to be proved wrong, but I can't imagine making dramatic upgrades in this area, no matter how many scandals."